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2
The Role of Performance
Management in Good Governance
Carolyn J. Heinrich
University of Texas at Austin 
What the people want is less government and more governance. 
—Harlan Cleveland.1 
In the social sciences literature, the word “governance” has become 
ubiquitous. Avinash Dixit (2002) describes an explosion of the term 
“governance” in the economics literature based on his search of the 
EconLit database, which showed just fi ve occurrences of the word in 
the 1970s, 112 references in the 1980s, 3,825 in the 1990s, and, in the 
fi ve years from 2000–2005, 7,948 instances.  
In broad terms, Lynn, Heinrich, and Hill (2001, p. 7) have described 
governance as “regimes of laws, rules, judicial decisions and adminis-
trative practices that constrain, prescribe and enable the provision of 
publicly supported goods and services.”  Ultimately, governance deter-
mines government performance. Correspondingly, the goal or role of 
performance management is to determine how public sector regimes, 
agencies, programs, and activities can be authorized, organized, and 
managed to perform at the highest levels in achieving public purposes 
and desired outcomes. Or, in the “reinventing government” conceptual-
ization of it, performance management is one tool or means for bring-
ing about more productive and effi cient allocations of public sector 
resources (i.e., more effi cient, results-oriented, and responsive gover-
nance). 
In The Dynamics of Performance Management, Donald Moynihan 
(2008, pp. 4–5) describes the beginning of the twenty-fi rst century as 
an “era of governance by performance management.”  He asks, “How 
important are performance management reforms to the actual manage-
ment of government?” and answers his own question: “It is only a slight 
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exaggeration to say that we are betting the future of governance on the 
use of performance information.” 
In fact, performance management may be one of the longest-
enduring reform movements in public administration, with origins that 
go back to the nineteenth-century writings of Woodrow Wilson (1887). 
Wilson proposed a “scientifi c” and more “business-like” approach to 
public administration, which was later picked up and expanded in the 
scientifi c management movement of the early 1900s. Scientifi c man-
agement promoted the careful analysis of workers’ tasks and work 
arrangements, with the objective of maximizing effi ciency by planning 
work procedures according to a technical logic, setting standards, and 
exercising controls to ensure conformity with standards (Taylor 1911). 
Paul Light’s (1997) classic work The Tides of Reform: Making Gov-
ernment Work, 1945–1995 compared the philosophies, movements, and 
other management strategies that come and go to tides which ebb and 
fl ow, overlapping as one comes in and another goes out—a conceptu-
alization that aptly describes performance management since the late 
1800s. Performance management has been coming in and going out 
of fashion, or ebbing and fl owing, for more than a century, although 
some suggest it returned in tidal-wave proportions in the late twentieth 
century. Indeed, a mantra of the early 1990s, “reinventing government,” 
proposed reforming government so that it would operate more like a 
business—focused on effi ciency and getting results.
This intensifi ed focus on “getting results” motivates a central ques-
tion of this chapter: how can performance management contribute to 
good governance and improved government performance (as defi ned 
by public preferences for the means and ends of governance)? This 
chapter will address four key issues concerning the role of performance 
management in good governance:
1) Our history with performance management—the effort to 
improve the effi ciency and effective functioning of govern-
ment—is long, and its origins in economics and business are 
refl ected in the design of our performance management sys-
tems today.
2) Even in fairly simple and amenable contexts, designing an 
appropriate performance management system is challeng-
ing; the complexities of the public sector and our multi-
layered, representative government system greatly compound 
the challenges.
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3) What is the result of applying a promising governance tool in 
a rather blunt form that skirts the complexities of the public 
sector?
4) If we are, in fact, betting the future of governance on perfor-
mance management, what are the lessons that we have learned 
to date that can be used to improve its effectiveness?
THE ORIGINS OF PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT
To understand how performance management is viewed and con-
ducted today, it is helpful to look back at the origins of performance 
management. It is largely recognized, in the works of political scientists 
as well as economists, that the roots of performance management lie in 
agency theory, as fi rst developed in economics and business manage-
ment (Wood 2010). The typical early performance-measurement system 
debuted in a factory production setting and was based largely on scien-
tifi c management principles—i.e., its work processes were guided by 
technical analysis, and it established production controls and standards 
to maximize effi ciency. In the agency-theory framework, the owner 
hires managers and workers to generate profi ts (with the owner or man-
ager acting as principal, and the workers as agents). A key objective of 
the principal is to then design a contract that aligns principal and agent 
incentives and achieves the production objectives of the principal. This 
is made challenging, however, by the fact that these relationships are 
frequently typifi ed by confl icts in goals and values, as well as privately 
held information or information asymmetries.
It is here that a role for performance management enters in—both 
in monitoring worker actions, outputs, and outcomes and in develop-
ing an incentive scheme with rewards or sanctions that align principal 
and agent interests—in essence, a contractual relationship with perfor-
mance expectations and credible provisions for enforcing them. How-
ever, even in a simple production system that assumes
• organizational goals and production tasks that are known to 
both sides, 
• a linear relationship between efforts and outputs, 
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• verifi able employee efforts, 
• the dominance of self-interest, and
• a relatively small number of variables for managers to control, 
an enforceable contract is diffi cult to achieve. In fact, in economics and 
business management, it has long been acknowledged that the richer 
(more complex) “real world” circumstances hardly ever correspond to 
the strict conditions of a simple linear incentive scheme (Holmstrom 
and Milgrom 1987).
There are two main challenges presented by agency theory that 
complicate efforts to establish viable performance-based contracts 
(Holmstrom 1982). One is the well-known problem of adverse selec-
tion, where employees’ true motivations or capabilities for produc-
ing a desired outcome are unknown to employers (i.e., there is hidden 
information). The second is moral hazard and unobservability, in which 
employees’ efforts or actions are not observable or readily measured; 
this creates conditions that can lead to shirking or distorted results. 
Recent headlines reporting cheating scandals in K–12 schools—which 
are under pressure to meet performance targets on standardized tests set 
by the No Child Left Behind (NCLB) Act—have illuminated a textbook 
case of how these problems can undermine performance management 
efforts (Rich 2013). 
Yet many contracts and performance management systems still 
incorporate basic linear (or “straight-line”) incentive schemes, largely 
because of their perceived simplicity and the signifi cant costs associ-
ated with establishing a more intricate contract or system of incen-
tives for inducing work and responsible management. A straight-line 
approach typically defi nes a required (linear) rate of performance 
improvement from an initial score or target level, and it may also spec-
ify an ending value corresponding to a maximum performance level, 
such as NCLB’s goal of 100 percent profi ciency in mathematics for 
public school students by 2014 (see Figure 2.1). No Child Left Behind 
is also an example, however, of an important shortcoming of straight-
line models for establishing performance expectations: they are seldom 
constructed using empirical data or other evidence that would generate 
realistic expectations for performance (Koretz and Hamilton 2006). In 
fact, the U.S. Department of Education has made it clear that it is aware 
that the performance management system under NCLB is not working. 
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As Secretary of Education Arne Duncan testifi ed before the U.S. Senate 
Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions some two years 
ago, “The closer we have gotten to 2014, the more NCLB has changed 
from an instrument of reform into a barrier to reform. And, the kids who 
have lost the most from that change are . . . students with disabilities, 
low-income and minority students, and English learners” (U.S. Depart-
ment of Education 2013, p. 1). 
Figure 2.1  Annual Expectations Set by the No Child Left Behind Act for 
Increased Performance among Students in Grades K–8 Tested 
in Math, 2002–2014  (% that must be met of students testing 
at the “profi cient” level)
NOTE:  Figure shows the expected percentage of students each year that should achieve 
a rating of “profi cient” in testing for math under the legislation.  The bar for 2002, the 
fi rst year the law was in effect, shows the actual percentage of students who tested as 
profi cient in math that year, and no improvement was required for the fi rst year fol-
lowing that. But thereafter, increasing percentages of profi ciency were set for each 
year, culminating in 2014, when 100 percent of kindergarteners through eighth grad-
ers were expected to be profi cient in math.  (The exception was 2006, when the expec-
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ADDED COMPLEXITIES OF PERFORMANCE
MANAGEMENT IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR
As a matter of fact, from the start, the application of agency theory 
to the design of performance management systems in the public sec-
tor has been considerably more complex than many anticipated. First, 
just who is the principal in a given governance setting? Governance 
in the public sector is multilayered (or hierarchical) and dynamic. In 
the “logic of governance” model that Lynn, Heinrich, and Hill (2001) 
describe, actors can be identifi ed as the principal in one relationship and 
the agent in another (as shown by the repetition of the lettered catego-
ries in the progression below). Or, one might characterize a relationship 
as having multiple principals, depending on the level of focus. Lynn, 
Heinrich, and Hill’s model specifi es a hierarchy of governance relation-
ships between
(a) citizen preferences and interests expressed politically and (b) 
legislative choice,
(b) legislator preferences in enacted legislation and (c) formally 
authorized structures and processes in public agencies,
(c) structure of formal authority and (d) de facto organization and 
management of agencies and programs and their activities,
(d) organization and administration or management of agencies 
and (e) primary work of public agencies,
(e) primary work of public agencies generates output or results that 
are subject to (f) stakeholder/citizen assessments of public sec-
tor performance, and
(f) stakeholder/citizen assessments expressed politically and (g) 
public and legislative interests and preferences.
In addition, consensus or clarity on goals is often lacking among 
citizens, and sometimes in originating legislation as well. Consider, 
for, example, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) 
of 2010. There are nine titles or goals of the ACA, but discord at both 
the federal and state levels since its passage refl ects a lack of consensus 
about how we will implement the law and simultaneously achieve a 
number of its core goals, including
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• affordable health care for all Americans, 
• increased quality and effi ciency of health care, and 
• improved access to innovative medical therapies. 
Furthermore, the implementation of the ACA is not only requiring 
cooperation across multiple levels of governance, but also the creation 
of new governing structures (e.g., health care insurance exchanges and 
other new forms of public-private partnerships for health care adminis-
tration) that may add new layers of governance relationships.
The public sector is also distinctive in that its primary work or pro-
duction technologies typically involve complex, nonmanual work, char-
acterized by multitasking and multilevel interactions and public-private 
sector partnerships and coordination, such as in the delivery of publicly 
funded health care, education, and social services. Nonstandardized 
outputs make the accurate measurement of performance and the con-
struction of performance benchmarks both more challenging and more 
costly. In addition, in designing performance management systems and 
incentives in new contexts, we often begin with an imperfect under-
standing of agents’ means for infl uencing performance and  their likely 
responses to incentives. The potential for unintended consequences 
as performance management and the use of performance-based con-
tracts expand into unchartered public-sector territory is high (Koning
and Heinrich 2013). 
For example, market-based incentives were developed and 
employed in child welfare agencies in Wayne County, Michigan (the 
Detroit metropolitan area), with the objective of improving reunifi ca-
tion rates and other permanency outcomes for children in the child wel-
fare system. The performance incentive system was designed to provide 
a lower per-diem rate, with an initial lump sum payment to agencies 
for the provision of services and fi nancial bonuses for the movement 
of foster children into permanent placements (and for sustaining them). 
McBeath and Meezan (2010) explain that it was expected that the per-
formance bonuses would provide incentives to improve performance 
and would generate costs savings along a number of dimensions, 
including 
• the rates at which reunifi cation and adoption were secured, 
• the time needed to achieve permanency in placements, 
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• rates of recidivism upon exit from agency care, and 
• the number of youth in foster care. 
In turn, the mechanisms by which managers might infl uence these child 
welfare outcomes included the services provided to children and fami-
lies in foster care and in moving children into permanent placements 
(e.g., case management, supervised parent-child visits, and special-
ized services in the community), as well as the structural and technical 
aspects of service provision, such as agency staffi ng and caseloads per 
worker, worker training, service coordination, and supervision.
In their empirical analysis, McBeath and Meezan (2010) fi nd that 
children served by Wayne County agencies under performance-based 
contracts were less likely to be reunifi ed and were more likely to 
enter kinship foster homes, and that these children and their families 
received fewer in-agency therapeutic and nontherapeutic services and
community services. In other words, the performance-based contracting 
system generated mostly unintended consequences. Although several 
explanations are plausible, it appears that incentives to reduce service 
costs and speed up the identifi cation of potential permanency options 
for children dominated agency and worker responses, which led to 
reductions in important within-agency services. These reductions may 
have subsequently decreased performance on the desired outcomes.
Finally, the public sector is also distinct from the private sector in 
the extent to which political infl uences may be brought to bear at many 
different levels. Goals and priorities can change swiftly, and entire 
agencies or authority structures can be reorganized, as well as the foci 
of primary work.2  This ensures that any performance management or 
incentive systems in public agencies will be dynamic. In addition, prin-
cipals may also choose to change or replace performance measures over 
time, as agents (employees) learn how to (strategically) manipulate 
performance measures to increase measured performance in ways that 
do not necessarily improve outcomes (Heinrich and Marschke 2010). 
Widespread reports of teaching to the test, manipulating who takes 
standardized tests, and other means for infl ating test scores in K–12 
public education are just one example of gaming the system in public-
sector performance management, and one that is motivating debate 
among education policymakers and spurring ongoing efforts to improve 
education performance measures and accountability systems.
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APPLYING PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT
BLUNTLY IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR
Having considered the role of performance management in good 
governance from a more theoretical or abstract perspective, it is useful 
to work through some of the challenges in greater depth with a concrete 
policy application for an important, publicly provided service: K–12 
public education. In 1983, an infl uential report, A Nation at Risk: The 
Imperative for Educational Reform, fi rst warned that U.S. educational 
institutions were losing sight of their basic goals and high expecta-
tions and putting the economic well-being and security of the nation in 
jeopardy. The report set off alarm bells by pointing out that, when sev-
eral educational measures were tallied among peer nations, the United 
States came in seventh. 
Today, we are spending close to $600 billion annually on our public 
elementary and secondary school system, and the public is demanding 
greater accountability and results. Yet 20 countries now have higher 
graduation rates than the United States. Almost three decades of educa-
tional reform efforts appear to have left the country even further behind, 
and dropout rates have remained stubbornly high. Furthermore, public 
and private stakeholders in education are increasingly at odds over what 
types of interventions and incentives are needed to turn these trends 
around.
Indeed, public education today is characterized by elaborate but 
chaotic governing structures, widely varying views on appropriate 
means and ends for improving education and how trade-offs among 
goals should be managed, an increasingly complex technology with 
nonstandardized outputs (which we subject to standardized measures of 
outcomes), and political infl uences that interject their agendas at many 
levels. As Finn and Petrilli (2013) describe it, there are
too many cooks in the education kitchen and nobody really in 
charge. We bow to the mantra of “local control” yet, in fact, nearly 
every major decision affecting the education of our children is 
shaped (and misshaped) by at least four separate levels of gover-
nance: Washington, the state capitol, the local district, and the indi-
vidual school building itself. And that’s without even considering 
intermediate units (such as the regional education-service centers 
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seen in Texas, New York, Ohio, and elsewhere), the courts (which 
exert enormous infl uence on our schools), or parents and guard-
ians, and the degree to which all of their decisions infl uence the 
nature and quality of a child’s schooling. (p. 21)
Drawing education governance into the “logic of governance” 
model outlined earlier, the complexities of multiple layers of education 
governance and the various actors (both principals and agents) at each 
level are apparent, as shown below:
(a) citizen preferences and interests expressed politically and (b) 
legislative choice (Elementary and Secondary Education Act 
[ESEA] and pending reauthorization of the 2002 ESEA that 
created No Child Left Behind);
(b) legislator preferences in enacted legislation and (c) formally 
authorized structures and processes in public agencies (the U.S. 
Department of Education and state and local educational agen-
cies—SEAs and LEAs—with governing authority);
(c) structure of formal authority and (d) de facto organization 
and management of agencies and programs and their activi-
ties (a complex division of responsibilities between SEAs and 
LEAs, with the added challenge of constrained authority under 
NCLB);
(d) organization and administration or management of agencies and 
(e) the primary work of public agencies (the primary work of 
education is changing—it is no longer just about giving class-
room lessons; services provided in schools and needs for them 
range widely and are compounded by unfunded mandates);
(e) the primary work of public agencies generates output or results 
that are subject to (f) stakeholder/citizen assessments of public 
sector performance (standardized achievement test scores are 
limited measures, especially when used to determine whether 
students have met profi ciency standards under NCLB); and
(f) stakeholder/citizen assessments expressed politically and (g) 
public and legislative interests and preferences (pending re-
authorization of the ESEA and waivers granted to a majority of 
states under NCLB).
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Our current governing structures in K–12 education consist of 
deeply layered and overlapping levels of decision making, which open 
more potential avenues for infl uence by different groups at varying lev-
els and with differing ideas and interests. At the same time, the lack of 
coherent management or clear lines of accountability is an ongoing, 
central problem in public education. As Hill (2013, p. 332) describes it, 
“Though every rule was made for a reason, no one carefully considered 
whether individual rules confl ict with one another.”  Could the use of 
performance management potentially bring some clarity and coherence 
to K–12 education governance?
Despite the many complexities in this sector, we have, in fact, pro-
ceeded full speed ahead with regimes for performance management 
and accountability in education that include strong incentives and high-
stakes consequences for many stakeholders. NCLB marked the begin-
ning of an assertive federal role in directing state and local practices 
to meet student performance standards. Unlike the ESEA’s fi rst-phase 
focus on distributing resources to the targeted populations, the sec-
ond phase sharpened the federal focus on student performance—what 
Wong (2013) has described as the emergence of “performance-based 
federalism.” The federal government holds states, districts, and schools 
accountable for a comprehensive set of standards, including annual aca-
demic progress, teacher quality, and achievement gaps, and for devel-
oping assessments of student performance relative to those standards.
Still, NCLB defi nes educational success primarily based on stan-
dardized testing snapshots of students’ performance, rather than on 
individual students’ growth, and current funding and accountability sys-
tems presume “same-age cohorts of students proceeding in lockstep,” 
says Wilson (2013, p. 96). As is consistent with the origins of perfor-
mance management discussed above, Linda Darling-Hammond (2002, 
p. 6) of Stanford University describes how our test-based accountability 
system refl ects a “factory-model approach” to education (as developed 
by early twentieth-century scientifi c managers such as Frederick Taylor 
and Franklin Bobbit), in which schools are organized “to process large 
batches of students in assembly-line fashion rather than to ensure that 
students are well-known by their teachers and treated as serious learn-
ers.”  She notes that urban high schools 
typically hold at least 2,000 to 3,000 students, who may see six 
or eight teachers each year for 45 minutes apiece. In cities such 
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as Los Angeles, teachers daily see 180 to 200 students, who cycle 
through the classroom to be stamped with a lesson as if they were 
on a conveyer belt. Teachers are asked to individualize curriculum 
for the needs of every learner when they have no way of coming 
to know their students well. Furthermore, the group of learners 
is much more diverse than at any other time in our history. Thus, 
the conditions for achieving high standards are lacking in many 
schools in the United States. (Darling-Hammond 2002, p. 6)
Recently, recognition of the limitations of profi ciency measures 
under NCLB has propelled alternative approaches to measuring educa-
tional performance, particularly value-added measures. A basic value-
added model compares the individual growth of a group of students 
(e.g., in a given classroom or school) to average growth of the popu-
lation of interest (e.g., growth among all students in the state). Some 
value-added models are also constructed to account for factors out-
side the control of teachers or schools in estimating growth in student 
achievement over time. Although these are (arguably) better measures 
of performance than profi ciency levels, should society be ratcheting up 
the stakes that it attaches to them, as we have recently seen in some 
large, urban school districts?
One of the most controversial recent developments in performance 
management in education has been the high-profi le, public dissemina-
tion of value-added measures of teacher performance in large school 
districts, including those in Los Angeles and New York. Calculated by 
third parties (outside the district), the value-added measures associ-
ated with specifi c teachers were published in the Los Angeles Times 
(latimes.com 2011a) and by the New York City Department of Educa-
tion (Santos 2012). The objective was to get the performance informa-
tion directly to the citizen (parent) stakeholders, who could use this 
information and their political power to drive public-sector perfor-
mance improvements.
However, in New York City, the margin of error in value-added 
measures was so wide that the average confi dence interval around each 
rating spanned 35 percentiles in math and 53 percentiles in English, 
the city said. Some teachers were judged on as few as 10 students. In 
publishing the Los Angeles numbers, the L.A. Times acknowledged that 
value-added measures “do not capture everything about a teacher or 
school’s performance.”  The L.A. Times also published comments from 
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teachers in response to the publication of their ratings. The following is 
an example of a typical teacher comment (or protest) of the value-added 
ratings:
Please note that these ratings are based on inaccurate data. Dur-
ing my time at Westwood Charter Elementary, I have only taught 
Kindergarten (where students at that grade level do NOT take the 
California Standards Test). I have also never taught 3rd Grade in 
my teaching career. (latimes.com 2011b)
A study by Mathematica Policy Research (Schochet and Chiang 
2010) found that the error rate for value-added scores (based on three 
years of data) was 25 percent. Therefore, a three-year model would rate 
one out of every four teachers incorrectly, and when only one year of 
data was analyzed, the error rate jumped to 35 percent. 
It is widely known that tests are limited measures of student knowl-
edge and learning, and that there is inevitably human and statistical 
error that enters into their administration. In addition, there are well-
documented negative, unintended consequences to high-stakes test-
ing—overly narrow and excessive test preparation, gaming the sys-
tem, reduced effort and withdrawal on the part of students, and lower 
graduation rates—particularly for low-performing subgroups (National 
Research Council 2011).
Thus, a major concern with the direction we are currently taking 
with performance management in public education is that we appear to 
be treating test-based accountability like a magic bullet. Education per-
formance assessments (via student testing) are just one tool for improv-
ing governance and accountability to the public for outcomes, and such 
testing will be a tool of limited use if we do not address the variety of 
governance challenges that plague our K–12 education system. 
LESSONS FOR IMPROVING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF 
PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT IN CONTRIBUTING 
TO GOOD GOVERNANCE
Primarily, this chapter highlights one policy area (education) where 
we have encountered challenges in designing performance manage-
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ment systems to improve governance and performance. The lessons 
that follow—regarding what we have learned about the role of perfor-
mance management in contributing to good governance and improv-
ing government outcomes—could be applied to workforce investment, 
welfare-to-work programs, health care, child welfare systems, environ-
mental protection, and other areas where we have ventured forth (and, 
at times, retraced our steps) in performance management. What are 
some of these common lessons?
First, the effective use of performance management demands not 
only clarity of goals but also their translation into empirical measures 
that accurately and adequately characterize our ends (or intended out-
comes). Where we fail on either of these requisite components, the per-
formance management system may risk doing more harm than good. In 
many cases, the data available simply are not up to the task. We have 
also learned that short-term, readily available performance measures 
often do not correlate with longer-term impacts (Heckman, Heinrich, 
and Smith 2002). 
In light of these limitations, and recognizing that performance 
management in the public sector often grapples with multiple goals 
and complex production, we may be better off with multidimensional 
(or multiple) measures of performance to guide core agency work. A 
number of school districts and states are now developing these types of 
multipurpose, multiple-indicator performance management systems for 
K–12 education, including the New York City Department of Education, 
which is using multiple indicators to measure student progress, student 
performance, and the school environment (New York City Department 
of Education 2014). A potential trade-off, of course, is that a more intri-
cate or complicated system and set of incentives would likely place a 
greater demand on public capacities for managing such a system.
A second lesson is that we often begin with imperfect measures 
of performance and then learn about how employees or stakeholders 
respond to them in implementation, including their weaknesses and 
how they might be gamed. We may less often get a performance mea-
sure or incentive system “right” on the fi rst try (as occurred in the case 
of child welfare agencies in Michigan), but that does not imply that 
further efforts should be abandoned.  For the many reasons highlighted 
in this chapter, public sector performance management systems will 
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necessarily be dynamic, and we should expect to replace performance 
measures or revise system incentives and other features over time.
In addition, caution should also be exercised in attaching high stakes 
(or serious consequences) to performance results, given the known 
challenges and imperfections of our performance measures (such as the 
teacher value-added measures that have recently been publicly dissemi-
nated). The awarding of performance bonuses, “naming and shaming” 
(as in the publication of teacher value-added ratings), termination of 
contracts, or retractions of program funding would best be backed or 
verifi ed by multiple sources of quantitative and qualitative evidence 
before going forward. A counterargument frequently offered against 
eliminating high stakes altogether is that the performance management 
and incentive systems would lose their “teeth” and purpose. Evidence 
to date, however, suggests that individuals and organizations are highly 
responsive to performance standards, even when the rewards are mini-
mal, such as peer recognition (Bevan and Hood 2006; Heinrich 2007).
Another important lesson that we are increasingly coming to under-
stand is that performance management systems are likely to be more 
effective tools of governance if we focus more on their use for diagnos-
tic purposes. That is, resources and rewards should follow their effective 
use in improving government and program outcomes, rather than for 
hitting performance targets. In the public education example, schools or 
teachers would be rewarded for using information on students’ perfor-
mance to help increase their learning, ideally measured in terms of their 
individual growth  (i.e., not just based on test score levels or gains). 
This would likely be a more appropriate outcome to report publicly (for 
the sake of transparency), and, if measured suffi ciently well, it would 
also be rewarding the right types of efforts to increase performance 
(i.e., not success in increasing test-taking skills but rather effective use 
of performance information to help students succeed academically).
One well-known example of effective use of performance manage-
ment information to diagnose and address performance problems is the 
CompStat/CitiStat model, which has been widely used in policing, and 
in other public service sectors as well. Four basic principles underlie 
the model:
1) accurate, timely intelligence
2) rapid deployment
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3) effective tactics
4) relentless follow-up and assessment
CompStat starts with collecting data, analyzing them, and present-
ing them in visual form, but the key to the apparent success of this sys-
tem is how those data or statistics are subsequently used.  When the data 
are presented in graphic form to organizational leaders and employees, 
questions are raised and solutions are discussed. But it is not a one-
time exercise—employees in the agencies or departments continually 
return to the same indicators and reevaluate performance. They also 
refl ect on the decisions that they make based on the data, with the goal 
of improving performance over time. To date, this CompStat approach 
appears to have worked effectively for the “meat and potatoes” of gov-
ernment—e.g., refuse collection, fi lling potholes, police and emergency 
response—but can it be expanded to more complex areas of government 
intervention, such as improving health care and education outcomes or 
reducing domestic violence?
And fi nally, why continue at all with performance management in 
the public sector, given the signifi cant challenges, risks, costs, and the 
politics and messiness of governance?  That might be best answered 
with another question: In its absence, how do we better guide our gov-
erning systems to perform at higher levels and more effi ciently and 
effectively achieve public purposes and desired outcomes?
Notes
1. Harlan Cleveland was the founding dean of the University of Minnesota’s Hubert 
H. Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs in 1972. He also served as President 
Lyndon Johnson’s U.S. ambassador to NATO from 1965 to 1969 and, earlier, as 
U.S. assistant secretary of state for international organization affairs, from 1961 
to 1965.
2. A well-known example of rapid agency restructuring occurred when President 
Ronald Reagan appointed Anne Gorsuch to head the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) in 1981. Gorsuch came into her role with the view that the EPA 
was overregulating business and that the agency was too large and ineffi cient. As 
she sharply shifted the agency’s mission, numerous career bureaucrats were re-
assigned, demoted, or pressured to resign, in an attempt to align employees with 
the agency’s revised goals.  However, EPA employees who identifi ed with the for-
mer EPA goals, acting as “organizational stewards,” ultimately thwarted Gorsuch’s 
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efforts, which they did not perceive to be in the best interests of the public, and she 
departed from the agency after 22 months. 
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